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The Value of Security Agreements 
Bernd Rudolph 
Summary : The purpo s e o f t h i s paper i s t o examine s e c u r i t y agreements 
i n t he l i g h t of some w e l l known models o f f i n a n c i a l t h e o r y . I n s e c t i o n 
1 a s u r v e y of common c r e d i t s u p p o r t d e c i s i o n models i s g i v e n and t h e 
r o l e o f c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n i s examined i n the c o n t e x t o f t h e s e models. 
S e c t i o n 2 seeks t o p r o v e t h a t t he n e o c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y o f f i n a n c e f a i l s 
t o e x p l a i n the e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e o f s e c u r i t y agreements i n c r e d i t -
c o n t r a c t s . S e c t i o n 3 examines a r a t h e r new a p p r o a c h and i t i s shown 
on the b a s i s o f t h i s a p p r o a c h t h a t s e c u r i t y agreements can be i n t e r -
p r e t e d i n a r a t h e r s a t i s f a c t o r i n g manner. C o l l a t e r a l s and c r e d i t 
c o v e n a n t s a r e r e a l i z e d as i n s t r u m e n t s o f i n f l u e n c i n g t h e t r u s t w o r t h i -
ness o f the b o r r o w e r . I n s e c t i o n s 4 and 5 f i n a l l y s e v e r a l t y p e s o f 
c r e d i t c o n t r a c t c o v e n a n t s a r e s t r u c t u r i z e d and d i s c u s s e d w i t h r e s p e c t 
t o t h e i r p r a c t i c a l e f f i c i e n c y . I n t h e a p p e n d i x some main r e s u l t s o f 
the n e o c l a s s i c a l a p p r o a c h a r e p r o v e d i n a more g e n e r a l way. 
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1. A S u r v e y o f C r e d i t S u p p o r t D e c i s i o n M o d e l s 
1.1 C r e d i t D e c i s i o n s i n a R e s t r i c t e d C a p i t a l M a r k e t 
To d i s c u s s t h e com p r e h e n s i o n of s e c u r e d d e b t i n t h e s e v e r a l a p proaches 
of f i n a n c i a l t h e o r y i t i s u s e f u l t o c l a s s i f y t h e a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t 
the e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e c r e d i t o r s i n t h e d i f f e r e n t models o f c r e d i t 
s u p p o r t d e c i s i o n , as shown i n f i g u r e 1. 
F i r s t o f a l l one c a n d i s t i n g u i s h c r e d i t s u p p o r t d e c i s i o n s when l e n d e r s 
have s e c u r e e x p e c t a t i o n s from such d e c i s i o n s under r i s k o r u n c e r t a i n -
t y . C r e d i t s u p p o r t d e c i s i o n s w i t h s e c u r e e x p e c t a t i o n s a r e s t r i c t l y 
spoken t r i v i a l d e c i s i o n s , b u t o f t e n d i s c u s s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h im-
p e r f e c t c a p i t a l m a r k e t s w i t h c r e d i t r e s t r i c t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e t h i s 
c a s e i s i n c l u d e d i n the scheme of f i g u r e 1. On r e s t r i c t e d c a p i t a l 
m a r k e t s c r e d i t r a t i o n i n g i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e . C r e d i t r a t i o n i n g 
i t s e l f can be i n t e r p r e t e d as a r e a c t i o n o f t h e l e n d e r on t h e u n c e r -
t a i n t y a bout the f u t u r e f i n a n c i a l r e s u l t o f h i s i n v e s t m e n t s . T h i s un-
c e r t a i n t y i s o n l y i m p l i c i t l y t r e a t e d i n t h e l e n d e r ' s c a l c u l a t i o n , 
above a l l i n t h e form o f f i x e d c r e d i t l i n e s . C o l l a t e r i z a t i o n i n such 
an a p p r o a c h i s t o be seen as a d i f f e r e n t t o o l t o l i m i t t h e c r e d i t o r ' s 
commitment. 
1.2 M a r k e t U n c e r t a i n t y 
As H i r s h l e i f e r and R i l e y (1979) made c l e a r i n t h e i r r e m a r k a b l e ex-
p o s i t o r y s u r v e y on the economics o f u n c e r t a i n t y and i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t 
the a n a l y t i c a l d e c i s i o n t h e o r y has t o d e a l w i t h two k i n d s of u n c e r -
t a i n t y : t he market u n c e r t a i n t y and t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l o r e v e n t u n c e r -
t a i n t y . A l t h o u g h the f i n a n c i a l l i t e r a t u r e c o n s i d e r s a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e -
l y e v e n t u n c e r t a i n t y , t h e r e i s the r e m a r k a b l e e x c e p t i o n o f M i l d e ' s 
(1980, 1981) a p p r o a c h w h i c h i s o f i n t e r e s t f o r our s u r v e y because o f 
comprehending the phenomenon o f s e c u r i n g d e b t e x p l i c i t y . 
We d i s c u s s t h i s a p p r o a c h s e p a r a t e d from o t h e r a p p r o a c h e s o f i n d i v i -
d u a l c r e d i t s u p p o r t d e c i s i o n , because the a s s u m p t i o n s about the ex-
p e c t a t i o n s o f the c r e d i t o r s a r e n o t u n i q u e . M i l d e wants t o e x p l a i n 
why t h e c r e d i t market i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a v a r i e t y o f d i f f e r e n t 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s , a phenomenon c a l l e d ' i n t e r e s t r a t e d i s p e r s i o n ' . 
I n t e r e s t r a t e d i s p e r s i o n i s n o t o n l y evoked by d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s w h i c h r e l a t e t o the d i f f e r e n t r a t i n g - c l a s s e s o f d e b t o r s , b u t 
f u r t h e r m o r e because d e b t o r s do not know the s p e c i f i c s e c u r i t y r e -
q u i r e m e n t s o f the banks. To p r e v e n t h i g h c o s t s o f s e a r c h i n g f o r the 
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Credit support decisions 
with certain expectations with uncertain expectations 
_ — l 
about terms of market 
t 
about credit repayment 
_ T 
û 
with a probability d i s -
t r i b u t i o n of the states 
dependent on the debtors' 
actions 
* ... 
with an exogenously 
given probability d i s t r i -









d e b t o r ' s s p e c i f i c r i s k c l a s s s p e c i a l i z e d bank, t h e b o r r o w e r s a c c e p t 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s t o o h i g h i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e i r s t a n d i n g . The c o s t s o f 
s e a r c h i n g a r e d i f f i c u l t t o s p e c i f y and t h u s one h a r d l y e x p e c t p r e -
s c r i p t i v e s t a t e m e n t s of t h i s a p p r o a c h . B u t i t i s a c o n v i n c i n g i d e a 
to e x p l a i n i n t e r e s t d i s p e r s i o n w i t h the p r e v e n t i o n o f s e a r c h i n g c o s t s . 
U n t i l now we d i d n o t s p e c i f y M i l d e ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f ' s e c u r e d d e b t ' . 
I n h i s model the d e b t o r pays h i s l o a n back w i t h t h e p r o c e e d s X ( s ) 
o f t h e i n v e s t m e n t p r o j e c t , and, under c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s w i t h t h e 
l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s Y(s) o f t h e c o l l a t e r a l . X ( s ) and Y ( s ) a r e 
random numbers w h i c h a r e dependent on t h e s t a t e of the w o r l d s. I f 
K i s t h e amount of the c r e d i t , and r i s t h e l o a n ' s i n t e r e s t r a t e 
a t t h e end o f t h e p e r i o d , t h e bank w i l l g e t : 
Z = mint (1 + r) K , X(s) + Y(s) ] 
I f t h e r e i s no doubt about the b o r r o w e r ' s w i l l i n g t o r e p a y the c r e -
d i t , each a s s e t of the d e b t o r i s l i a b l e t o t h e bank even w i t h o u t a 
c l a i m on a c o l l a t e r a l s e c u r i t y , and t h e r e f o r e t h e bank w i l l n o t need 
a c o l l a t e r a l Y t o s e c u r e t h e d e b t c l a i m . S e c u r i t i e s i n M i l d e ' s 
a p p r o a c h d e f i n e the f i r m ' s l e v e l o f s o l v e n c y , w h i c h i s measured by 
the amount of n e t p r o p e r t y b e f o r e c r e d i t s u p p o r t . 
T h e r e f o r e t h e r e s u l t s o f the model do n o t r e f e r t o the c o l l a t e r a l 
p o l i c y o f the bank, b u t t o the bank's s o l v e n c y p o l i c y s p e c i f y i n g t h e 
minimum s o l v e n c y r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r the c u s t o m e r . A s i m i l a r argumenta-
t i o n can be shown to h o l d f o r the d e f i n i t i o n o f s e c u r e d d e b t i n t h e 
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c r e d i t r a t i o n i n g a p p r o a c h o f S t i g l i t z and Weiss (198 1 ) . 
1.3 C r e d i t S u p p o r t D e c i s i o n s w i t h E v e n t U n c e r t a i n t y 
We a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d t h a t comprehending m a r k e t u n c e r t a i n t y i s the 
e x c e p t i o n o f the r u l e i n c r e d i t s u p p o r t t h e o r y . U s u a l l y one r e g a r d s 
e v e n t u n c e r t a i n t y , where an u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t t h e f u t u r e s t a t e s i s 
assumed w h i c h d e t e r m i n e the repayment o f t h e c r e d i t . D e c i s i o n t h e o r y 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s between the r i s k s i t u a t i o n , where t h e f u t u r e s t a t e s o f 
the w o r l d w i l l o c c u r w i t h s p e c i f i e d g i v e n p r o b a b i l i t i e s , and t h e 
gam b l i n g s i t u a t i o n , where t h e s t a t e s a r e t h e v a r i o u s a c t i n g p o s s i b i -
l i t i e s o f the opponent. 
I t t he s t a t e s o f the w o r l d o c c u r i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e b o r r o w e r ' s be-
h a v i o r , t h e n the r i s k o f the c r e d i t p o s i t i o n i s t o be seen as t h e 
r i s k on t h e l a c k i n g c r e d i t s t a n d i n g o f the d e b t o r . I f t h e s t a t e s 
depend on t h e a c t i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f the d e b t o r , t h e n the c r e d i t 
r i s k i s a c r e d i t r e l i a b i l i t y r i s k . B u t one s h o u l d assume t h a t c r e d i t 
s t a n d i n g and c r e d i t r e l i a b i l i t y r i s k do n o t o c c u r i s o l a t e d b u t i n 
c o m b i n a t i o n . 
The most e l a b o r a t e d n e o c l a s s i c a l a p p r o a c h o f the c r e d i t s u p p o r t 
t h e o r y c o n s i d e r s the r i s k o f a d e c r e a s i n g c r e d i t s t a n d i n g o f the 
bor r o w e r e x c l u s i v e l y . We w i l l d i s c u s s the main models o f the neo-
c l a s s i c a l a p p r o a c h i n the n e x t s e c t i o n . 
2. N e o c l a s s i c a l Theory and Se c u r e d Debt 
2.1 The B a s i c A p p r o a c h 
T h i s t h e o r y assumes t h a t a bank d e c i d e s about an i n d i v i d u a l c r e d i t 
s u p p o r t a t the time the customer a s k s f o r t h i s l o a n . Each c r e d i t 
d e c i s i o n i s made e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g t he t o t a l c r e d i t 
engagement o f the bank. The need o f an i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n i s c a u s e d 
i n d e f a u l t o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t the f u t u r e c r e d i t demand, and by t h e 
o r g a n i z a t i o n o f d e c e n t r a l i z e d bank d e c i s i o n s , w h i c h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
f o r b r a n c h bank systems (Rudolph 1974). 
The bank's d e c i s i o n s about c r e d i t s u p p o r t s depend on t h e n e t p r o f i t 
o f t h e c r e d i t p o s i t i o n s . L e t us d e f i n e K as t h e demanded l o a n 
amount, and r as the i n t e r e s t r a t e . F u r t h e r o n i i s the i n t e r e s t 
r a t e t he bank has t o pay f o r t h e r e f i n a n c e m e n t o f i t s c r e d i t s u p p o r t . 
Thus the mean o f the i n t e r e s t e x c e s s G o f a c r e d i t p o s i t i o n w i l l be 
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E (G) = (l + r ) K a ( r , K ) - ( l + i ) K , 
where a i s t h e mean c r e d i t repayment q u o t a . F o r a =1 t h e bank 
e x p e c t s t h e repayment a t the end o f t h e p e r i o d w i t h c e r t a i n t y , f o r 
a <1 t h e bank e x p e c t s w i t h a c e r t a i n p r o b a b i l i t y w h i c h among o t h e r s 
depends on t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e r and on t h e c r e d i t amount K t h a t 
t h e c r e d i t w i l l n o t be p a i d back i n t h e whole amount. 
G i v e n t h i s v e r y e a s y a p p r o a c h , one can s p e c i f y c o l l a t e r a l as an i n -
s t r u m e n t t o r a i s e the mean repayment q u o t a a . B u t n o t i c e t h a t s u c h 
a r e d u c t i o n of the c r e d i t f a i l m e n t i s o n l y i m a g i n a b l e i f s e v e r a l c r e -
d i t o r s s h a r e t h e chances and t h e r i s k o f the d e b t o r ' s a s s e t s . O n l y 
t h e n i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r one c r e d i t o r t o s h i f t r i s k t o t h e o t h e r s , i f 
h i s i n d i v i d u a l d e b t c o n t r a c t c o n t a i n s c o l l a t e r a l c o v e n a n t s . I f t h e 
bank i s t h e s o l e c r e d i t o r t he d e b t o r ' s t o t a l p r o p e r t y i s l i a b l e 
and an a d d i t i o n a l c o l l a t e r a l agreement c a n ' t improve the c r e d i t o r ' s 
p o s i t i o n . 
C o n c e r n i n g c r e d i t c o l l a t e r a l p o l i c y we do n o t g e t new f u n d a m e n t a l 
r e s u l t s o f t h e t h e o r y o f c r e d i t p o r t f o l i o d e c i s i o n s e x c e p t t h e now 
n e c e s s a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f e x p e c t e d f u t u r e v a l u e s 
o f the c o l l a t e r a l s e c u r i t y w i t h t h e e x p e c t e d f u t u r e v a l u e s o f t h e 
f i r m ' s t o t a l a s s e t s . 
2 . 2 S e c u r e d Debt and C a p i t a l M a r k e t E q u i l i b r i u m 
The t h e o r y o f c a p i t a l market e q u i l i b r i u m i n v e s t i g a t e s among o t h e r s 
whether a s h i f t o f d e f a u l t r i s k s f r o m one c r e d i t o r t o o t h e r c r e d i -
t o r s can cause any advantages f o r t h e d e b t o r . I n a c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h 
o u t s t a n d i n g d e b t t h e s e a d v a n t a g e s w o u l d r e s u l t i n a r i s e o f the 
market v a l u e o f the de b t and t h e r e f o r e i n an i n c r e a s e d m a rket v a l u e 
o f the f i r m . 
I f t he c r e d i t o r s a c t r a t i o n a l l y and on t h e p r e s u m p t i o n s u s u a l l y 
summarized f o r the a s s u m p t i o n o f a p e r f e c t c a p i t a l market one can 
show t h a t t he c o l l a t e r a l p o l i c y o f a l e v e r e d f i r m i s i r r e l e v a n t 
f o r i t s market v a l u e . One c o u l d c a l l t h i s s t a t e m e n t a n a l o g o u s t o the 
i r r e l e v a n c e h y p o t h e s i s o f M o d i g l i a n i and M i l l e r (1958) the c o l l a t e r a l 
i r r e l e v a n c e h y p o t h e s i s : G i v e n p e r f e c t c a p i t a l m a r k e t s p o s s i b l e r i s k 
d i f f e r e n c e s between c r e d i t p o s i t i o n s a r e f u l l y r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r 
market v a l u e s w i t h t he consequence t h a t r i s k t r a n s f e r s between c r e -
d i t o r s w i l l cause an a l t o g e t h e r e q u a l l y h i g h t o t a l m a r k e t v a l u e o f 
the o u t s t a n d i n g d e b t . 
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T h i s r e s u l t o f c a p i t a l market e q u i l i b r i u m t h e o r y (which w i l l be 
pr o v e d i n a more g e n e r a l way i n t h e a p p e n d i x ) c a n be e x p l a i n e d by a 
s i m p l e example. To t h a t end we i n s p e c t a company w i t h t he i n v e s t e d 
c a p i t a l c o n t a i n i n g o n l y two a s s e t s . A t the end o f t h e p e r i o d t h e l i -
q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s o f t h e two a s s e t s X and Y w i l l depend on t h r e e 
s t a t e s o f t h e w o r l d S i , s 2 and s 3 . The c o n t i n g e n t p r o c e e d s a r e 
shown i n t a b l e 1. 
The f i r m i n c u r s d e b t from bank A and bank B and has t o redeem 
the amount o f T^=55 and T ß = 5 5 a t the end o f the p e r i o d . P r e -
sumed the d e f a u l t f r e e i n t e r e s t r a t e i s 10 % and t h e market i s r i s k 
n e u t r a l so t h a t t h e p r e s e n t market v a l u e o f f i n a n c i a l c l a i m s i s t h e 
d i s c o u n t e d mean, t h e d e b t c l a i m s o f bank A and B b o t h have t h e 
v a l u e : 
F A = F B = 2 - Î . l [ 0 - 3 -
88 + 0 . 7 • n o ] = 47 
state S 3 mean 
liquidation ^ probability 0 .3 0 .4 0 . 3 
proceeds 
X 60 60 60 60 
Y 28 105 72 72 
X + Y 88 165 132 132 
table 1 
The v a l u e o f the e q u i t y o f the f i r m amounts t o 
E [0 .4 • 55 + 0 . 3 • 22] = 26 
and t h e t o t a l v a l u e o f the f i r m i s 
W = F + F + E = 120 . 
A B 
C o n s i d e r now bank A i n s i s t i n g on a c o l l a t e r a l t o s e c u r e i t s c r e d i t . 
The d e b t c o n t r a c t i s s e c u r e d i f the f i r m p l e d g e s t he a s s e t X o r Y 
or b o t h a s s e t s t o the bank w i t h the p r o v i s i o n t h a t s h o u l d t he f i r m 
d e f a u l t t h e bank has t h e r i g h t t o s e i z e and s e l l t h e c o l l a t e r a l i z e d 
a s s e t . S h o u l d t he p r o c e e d s from the s a l e e x c eed t h e o u t s t a n d i n g 
amount, t h e e x c e s s i s r e t u r n e d t o t h e f i r m . I f t h e p r o c e e d s a r e i n -
s u f f i c i e n t t o meet the o u t s t a n d i n g amount, the bank r e t a i n s a l l o f 
the p r o c e e d s and becomes an u n s e c u r e d c r e d i t o r f o r t h e r e m a i n i n g d e b t . 
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Assume the f i r m o f f e r s the a s s e t w i t h the l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s X 
as a s e c u r i t y t o the bank A . Because X = 60 f o r a l l s t a t e s t h e 
c r e d i t p o s i t i o n o f A i s r i s k l e s s and the v a l u e o f c l a i m A now i s 
Because o f Bank A's e x p l o i t a t i o n r i g h t on t h e s e c u r i t y the p a y i n g 
s c h e d u l e f o r bank B changes i n t h e s t a t e S i and B's c l a i m now 
has a v a l u e o f 
F = "7~~~7" (0 .3 • 33 + 0 . 7 • 55) = 44 . 
B 1.1 
The v a l u e o f t h e t o t a l d e b t , w h i c h i s F = 47 + 47 = 94 w i t h o u t c o l l a -
t e r a l , does n o t change w i t h s e c u r i n g t h e d e b t p o s i t i o n o f bank A . 
The c l a i m A's v a l u e g a i n s 3 u n i t s , b u t t h i s r i s e i s e x a c t l y compen-
s a t e d f o r by t h e 3 u n i t s d e c r e a s e o f t h e v a l u e o f c l a i m B . 
2.3 C o l l a t e r a l P o l i c y and N o n - M a r k e t - V a l u e Debt C l a i m s 
C o n t r a r y t o the j u s t d i s c u s s e d c o l l a t e r a l i r r e l e v a n c e h y p o t h e s i s 
S c o t t (1977) has shown t h a t a f i r m c an m aximize i t s v a l u e when i t 
uses a l l i t s a s s e t s as c o l l a t e r a l f o r t h e c r e d i t o r s . S c o t t i s a r g u -
i n g t h a t i n the c a s e o f the d e b t o r ' s d e f a u l t some d e b t has t o be 
p a i d b e f o r e d i s t r i b u t i n g the b a n k r u p t c y e s t a t e t o the c r e d i t o r s . 
These c o s t s a r e e s p e c i a l l y s a l e s t a x e s , p r o p e r t y t a x e s , e x c i s e t a x e s , 
the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o s t s o f b a n k r u p t c y and l e g a l damages c l a i m s . 
T y p i c a l l y , t h e s e c l a i m s have t o be p a i d o n l y under c e r t a i n c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s and t h e y a r e not c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f the v a l u e 
o f the d e b t . T h e r e f o r e they do n o t i n c u r t h e v a l u e o f the f i r m . Thus, 
i f a l l the d e b t o r ' s a s s e t s a r e t r a n s f e r r e d as c o l l a t e r a l t o the c r e -
d i t o r s w i t h c l a i m s t r a d e d on t h e c a p i t a l m a r k e t , t h e y o u t r a n k t h e 
mentioned non-market v a l u e d c l a i m s i n c a s e o f d e f a u l t . The market 
v a l u e o f the f i r m r e a c h e s i t s maximum when t h e c l a i m s w i t h l a c k i n g 
market v a l u e s have the l o w e s t p r i o r i t y compared t o t h e c l a i m s o f the 
market p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
One can e a s i l y c o n f i r m t h i s r e s u l t w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e f o r m e r 
example. Look a g a i n a t t a b l e 1 t o see t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the v a l u e 
o f the f i r m ' s s e c u r i t i e s . B e s i d e t h e p a y a b l e d e b t of T^=55 and 
T D = 55 c o n s i d e r now a l s o some t a x c o s t s o f U = 33 , w h i c h have t o 
be p a i d i n d e p e n d e n t of the s t a t e o f t h e w o r l d i n t = 1 . I t i s 
assumed t h a t i n a d e f a u l t o f the f i r m the t a x c o s t s o u t r a n k the 
c l a i m s T. and T 0 . 
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Presumed f u r t h e r o n a d e f a u l t f r e e i n t e r e s t r a t e o f 10 % and a r i s k 
n e u t r a l c a p i t a l m a r k e t , t h e v a l u e o f the d e b t c l a i m s i s 
F r F B = 2 T T t o * 3 ( 8 S " 3 3 ) + 0 * 4 " 1 1 0 + 0 - 3 ( 1 3 2 - 3 3 ) J = 4 1 
and t h e market v a l u e o f e q u i t y i s 
E = T T 4 ( 1 6 5 " 1 1 0 ~ 3 3 )] = 8 • 
Thus t h e market v a l u e o f the f i r m amounts t o 
w = F + F +E = 90 . 
A B 
In a f i r s t s t e p we w i l l now s e c u r e the d e b t o f bank A w i t h the 
l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s X , t h e n i n a d d i t i o n we w i l l a l s o s e c u r e t h e 
de b t o f bank B w i t h t h e l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s o f Y t o o b s e r v e the 
a l t e r i n g o f the f i r m v a l u e when d i f f e r e n t s e c u r i n g s t r a t e g i e s a r e 
a p p l i e d . 
I f bank A g e t s t i t l e on the a s s e t w i t h the l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s 
X , i t s c r e d i t p o s i t i o n i s r i s k l e s s and t h e m a r k e t v a l u e has the 
amount o f 
F = - 50 . A 1.1 
Bank B has t o c o n s i d e r t h a t i n s t a t e s s i and S 3 t a x c o s t s have 
a h i g h e r p r i o r i t y and the v a l u e o f i t s c l a i m t h u s w i l l be o n l y 
F = — [ 0 . 4 • 55 + 0.3 • 44] = 32 . B 1.1 
The c o l l a t e r i z a t i o n o f bank A does n o t change t h e t o t a l m a r k e t 
v a l u e of t h e d e b t F - 8 2 because the r i s k t r a n s f e r f u l l y d i m i n i s h e s 
the c l a i m of bank B : the t a x c o s t s 'J = 33 o u t r a n k c l a i m B i n 
the c a s e o f d e f a u l t . 
But i f the c l a i m of bank B i s s e c u r e d by e x p l o i t a t i o n r i g h t s o f 
the l i q u i d a t i o n s p r o c e e d s Y ( w h i l e bank A keeps i t s c o l l a t e r a l ) , 
the market v a l u e o f d e b t F w i l l r i s e . I n t h i s c a s e =50 a g a i n , 
b u t bank B r e c e i v e s t h e l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s Y i n the s t a t e s s i 
and s 3 b e f o r e t h e t a x c o s t s a r e p a i d and t h i s w i l l i n c r e a s e t h e 
v a l u e o f i t s c l a i m t o 
F =7^-r [0.3 • 28 + 0.7 • 55] = 42.64 . B 1.1 
I f bank B would have a l s o a s u b o r d i n a t e e x p l o i t a t i o n r i g h t on t h e 
c o l l a t e r a l o f bank A , i t c o u l d o b t a i n a 5 u n i t r a i s e d l i q u i d a t i o n 
p r o f i t i n t h e s t a t e s i , and t h e d e b t v a l u e w o u ld be: 
F o = - i — [0.3 • 33 + 0.7 • 55] = 44 . B 1.1 
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The j u s t d e s c r i b e d c o l l a t e r a l p o l i c y can c r e a t e t h e maximum v a l u e 
o f the d e b t F =94 because t h e c r e d i t o r s A and B a r e a b l e t o 
s h i f t t h e utmost r i s k on the c l a i m U w h i c h does n o t p o s s e s s a 
market v a l u e . 
3. The Theory o f C r e d i t S u p p o r t D e c i s i o n s i n t h e L i g h t of the 
Economics o f I n f o r m a t i o n 
3.1 C o l l a t e r a l s as a T o o l t o L i m i t t h e C r e d i t a b i l i t y R i s k 
Our p r e v i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s about c o l l a t e r a l p o l i c y i n the scope of 
the n e o c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y o f c r e d i t s u p p o r t d e c i s i o n s f o c u s i n -the 
f o l l o w i n g r e s u l t s o f the t h e o r y o f t h e c r e d i t market e q u i l i b r i u m : 
• On a p e r f e c t and co m p l e t e c a p i t a l m arket the c o l l a t e r a l p o l i c y 
o f a f i r m i s i r r e l e v a n t f o r i t s m a r k e t v a l u e ( c o l l a t e r a l i r r e -
l e v a n c e h y p o t h e s i s ) . 
• C o n s i d e r i n g i n s u f f i c i e n c i e s o f t h e c a p i t a l m a r ket, i . e . market 
exogenous c l a i m s on the c o r p o r a t e ' s s e c u r i t i e s , a c o l l a t e r a l 
p o l i c y s h i f t i n g t he utmost r i s k from the market c r e d i t o r s t o the 
non-market c r e d i t o r s w i l l c a u s e the maximum market v a l u e o f the 
f i r m ( f u l l y c o l l a t e r a l p o l i c y ) . 
We a r e not s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e s e r e s u l t s o f t h e n e o c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y : 
A l t h o u g h s e c u r i n g d e b t c a u s e s h i g h p r i v a t e and p u b l i c c o s t s (moni-
t o r i n g c o s t s , c o n t r a c t c o s t s , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o s t s , law c o s t s e t c . ) 
t h i s i n s t r u m e n t i s s t i l l o f g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e on r e a l f i n a n c i a l mar-
k e t s . The n e o c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y can e x p l a i n t h i s d i s c r e p a n c y o n l y w i t h 
the t o t a l c o l l a t e r a l p o l i c y . B u t on r e a l c a p i t a l markets f u l l c o l l a -
t e r i z a t i o n i s r a t h e r t h e e x c e p t i o n t h a n t h e r u l e . 
On the o t h e r hand i t i s n o t u n u s u a l t h a t d e b t c o n t r a c t s i m p l y c o l l a -
t e r a l - a g r e e m e n t s even i f the c o v e n a n t e e p r e s u m p t i v e l y i s and remains 
the s o l e c r e d i t o r , so t h a t i n t h i s c a s e a r i s k t r a n s f e r t o o t h e r 
c r e d i t o r s i s o f no i m p o r t a n c e b e c a u s e s e c u r e d and u n s e c u r e d c r e d i t 
p o s i t i o n s a r e e q u i v a l e n t . 
I n c l u d i n g t h e r e a s o n i n g o f the economics o f i n f o r m a t i o n i n the neo-
c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y o f c r e d i t s u p p o r t d e c i s i o n s w i l l d i s c l o s e us a 
t h e o r e t i c a l base t o e x p l a i n t h e p r a c t i c e of c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n i n 
c r e d i t o r / d e b t o r r e l a t i o n s . B u t n o t i c e t h a t t h e i d e a s o f the econo-
mics o f i n f o r m a t i o n a r e t o c o m p l e t e o u r p r e v i o u s t h o u g h t s i n such 
a way t h a t d e c i d i n g about c r e d i t s u p p o r t the bank has t o c o n s i d e r 
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the r i s k o f c r e d i t s t a n d i n g and o f c r e d i t r e l i a b i l i t y combined. 
To c o n c r e t e t h e i d e a o f t h e economics o f i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s c o n t e x t 
i t i s u s e f u l t o i n v e s t i g a t e i n the f i r s t s t a g e t h e i s o l a t e d r i s k o f 
c r e d i t r e l i a b i l i t y . I t w i l l be shown t h a t c o l l a t e r a l can bound o r 
even e l i m i n a t e t h a t r i s k . I n the n e x t s e c t i o n we w i l l examine the 
s i t u a t i o n where b o t h r i s k s have t o be c o n s i d e r e d c o n j o i n t l y . 
The w e l l known model o f J a f f e e and R u s s e l l (1976) i s a f i r s t a p p r o a c h 
t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e i s o l a t e d r i s k o f c r e d i t r e l i a b i l i t y . The t o p i c o f 
t h e model i s the phenomenon o f c r e d i t r a t i o n i n g : " C r e d i t r a t i o n i n g 
o c c u r s when l e n d e r s q u o t e an i n t e r e s t r a t e on l o a n s and t h e n p r o c e e d 
t o s u p p l y a s m a l l e r l o a n s i z e t h a n t h a t demanded by th e b o r r o w e r s " . 
The n e o c l a s s i c a l s o l u t i o n of t h i s gap p r o p o s e s t h a t t h e u n s a t i s f i e d 
b o r r o w e r s w i l l o f f e r a h i g h e r i n t e r e s t r a t e , w h i c h w i l l m o t i v a t e the 
bank t o r i s e t h e l o a n s u p p l y f o r an i n c r e a s e d r i s k premium; t h i s 
p r o c e s s f i n a l l y w i l l end when c r e d i t s u p p l y and demand a r e i n e q u i -
l i b r i u m a t a c e r t a i n i n t e r e s t r a t e . 
C r e d i t r a t i o n i n g i s an i n s t r u m e n t o f t h e banks t o i n f l u e n c e the 
a v e r a g e s o l i d i t y o f t h e i r c u s t o m e r s h i p . A d e c r e a s e o f t h e mean c r e -
d i t s u p p l y can r e d u c e the number o f " d i s h o n e s t " d e b t o r s , because the 
i n c e n t i v e t o b r e a c h the c o n t r a c t i s s m a l l e r i f i t i s â p a l t r y c r e d i t 
amount. T h e r e f o r e c r e d i t r e l i a b i l i t y i s n o t a permanent ( f i x e d ) un-
c h a n g e a b l e c o n d i t i o n o f the b o r r o w e r , b u t a consequence of an econo-
m i c a l r e a s o n i n g . 
The b o r r o w e r w i l l f u l f i l l the c o n t r a c t ( i . e . r e p a y the l o a n ) i f i t 
i s e c o n o m i c a l advantageous and on the o t h e r s i d e he w i l l b r e a c h the 
c o n t r a c t i f t h i s b e h a v i o r i s p r o f i t a b l e . Through i t s d e b t - p o l i c y t h e 
bank can i n f l u e n c e the l u c r a t i v e n e s s o f repayment f o r t h e d e b t o r . I f 
n o t p a y i n g i n v o l v e s c e r t a i n c o s t s f o r the b o r r o w e r ( c o s t t o d e f a u l t ) 
t h e bank ca n r e d u c e the numbers o f b o r r o w e r s w h i c h have an a d v a n t a g e 
i f t h e y f a i l t o r e p a y . These c o s t s a r e g i v e n e x o g e n o u s l y i n t h e 
J a f f e e and R u s s e l l model, whereas the e x o g e n o u s l y g i v e n amount can 
be d i f f e r e n t f o r each b o r r o w e r . 
I n c o n t r a s t t o t h i s a s s u m p t i o n o f an exogenous c o s t f a c t o r R u d o l p h 
(1982) showed the a b i l i t y o f the banks to i n f l u e n c e t h e c o s t o f de-
f a u l t . Banks c o u l d e s p e c i a l l y i n c r e a s e t h e s e c o s t s i f t h e y e n c l o s e 
c o l l a t e r a l c o n v e n a n t s i n l o a n c o n t r a c t s so t h a t i n c a s e o f t h e 
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b o r r o w e r ' s nonpayment he w i l l l o s e p a r t o f h i s s e c u r i t i e s t o the 
bank. C o l l a t e r a l s t h e r e f o r e can i n c r e a s e the p r o b a b i l i t y o f r e p a y -
ment. 
W i t h t h e i n c l u s i o n o f c o l l a t e r a l i n t h e model o f J a f f e e and R u s s e l l 
one g e t s a common p r i c e e q u i l i b r i u m i n s t e a d o f t h e r a t i o n i n g e q u i l i -
b r i u m , because w i t h a g i v e n c r e d i t s t a n d i n g o f the b o r r o w e r the r e -
payment o f th e l o a n i s o n l y a q u e s t i o n of t h e d e b t o r ' s w i l l . 
S i n c e the a s s u m p t i o n of a g i v e n c r e d i t s t a n d i n g i s n o t r e a l i s t i c , we 
have t o examine i n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n t h e d e c i s i o n s o f a bank i n th e 
f a c e o f a c r e d i t s t a n d i n g r i s k and a c r e d i t r e l i a b i l i t y r i s k . We w i l l 
d i s c u s s the p roblems of t h i s s i t u a t i o n w i t h t h e h e l p o f o u r f o r m e r 
n u m e r i c a l example. 
3.2 Contemporaneous E x a m i n a t i o n o f C r e d i t S t a n d i n g R i s k and C r e d i t 
R e l i a b i l i t y R i s k 
L e t us t a k e a g a i n t h e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f X and Y , as 
shown i n t a b l e 1 t o d e m o n s t r a t e the s i m u l t a n e o u s a n a l y s i s o f t h e 
c r e d i t - s t a n d i n g and c r e d i t - r e l i a b i l i t y r i s k o f a f i r m . The d i s t r i -
b u t i o n s d e t e r m i n e the d e b t o r ' s c r e d i t s t a n d i n g f o r g i v e n l o a n quan-
t i t i e s . 
The c r e d i t r e l i a b i l i t y r i s k on t h e o t h e r hand i s t o be s een i n t h e 
f a c t t h a t the c r e d i t o r does n o t know whether the f i r m w i l l keep the 
a s s e t s w i t h the l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s X and Y u n t i l the end o f 
the p e r i o d t o s e r v e the bank's r e c e i v a b l e s o r i f t h e f i r m s e l l s t h e 
a s s e t s and d i s p o s e s o f the p r o c e e d s i n a n o t h e r way. C r e d i t o r s a r e 
f a c e d w i t h u n c e r t a i n e x p e c t a t i o n s w h i c h o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e l y p o s s i b l e 
p l a n s o f the f i r m w i l l be r e a l i z e d a f t e r the c r e d i t i s p l a c e d a t t h e 
f i r m ' s d i s p o s i t i o n . 
Swoboda (1975) c a l l s t h e s e r i s k s as d i s t r i b u t i o n r i s k s : " W e ' l l c a l l 
t he r i s k t h a t a p o s i t i o n o f a c r e d i t o r a l t e r s c a u s e d by s u b s e q u e n t 
d e c i s i o n s o f the f i r m d i s t r i b u t i o n r i s k " (as e.g. i s s u i n g a d d i t i o n a l 
d ebt w h i c h w i l l d i l u t e the c l a i m o f t h e o r i g i n a l c r e d i t o r ) . L a t e r on 
s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s o f the f i n a n c i a l l i t e r a t u r e f o c u s e d on t h i s p r o b l e m 
and summarized the main p o s t - c r e d i t s t r a t e g i e s o f d e b t o r s (Smith and 
Warner 1979b,Smith 1980). We w i l l d i s c u s s t h e s e s t r a t e g i e s b a s e d on 
t h e n u m e r i c a l example of t a b l e 1 and examine whether c r e d i t o r s c o u l d 
d i m i n i s h the d i s t r i b u t i o n r i s k w i t h the h e l p o f c o l l a t e r a l . 
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3.2.1 Changing the D i v i d e n d P o l i c y 
A f t e r t h e i s s u e o f the c r e d i t , the f i r m can r a i s e i t s d i v i d e n d r a t e , 
i n s p i t e o f a f o r m e r d e c l a r e d l o w e r r a t e , and t h u s i n c r e a s e t h e de-
f a u l t r i s k f o r t h e c r e d i t o r s . The d i v i d e n d payments ca n be f i n a n c e d 
by r e d u c e d i n v e s t m e n t ( b a l a n c e s h e e t c u t ) o r f i n a n c e d by i s s u i n g 
a d d i t i o n a l d e b t (change o f l i a b i l i t i e s ) . 
D i v i d e n d payments evoke a h i g h e r r i s k f o r t h e i n i t i a l c r e d i t o r , be-
c a u s e l i a b l e c a p i t a l ( e q u i t y ) i s s u b s t i t u t e d by u n l i a b l e c a p i t a l 
( d e b t ) . 
L e t us c o n s i d e r t h e f i r m o f our example a d d i n g a new l o a n w i t h a 
r e c e i v a b l e of T c = 22 i n t = 1 t o i t s s e n i o r d e b t ( w i t h r e c e i v a b l e s 
o f T A = 5 5 and T ß = 55 ) . 
A f t e r the a d d i t i o n a l l o a n i s i s s u e d , the m a rket v a l u e o f t h e whole 
d e b t w i l l be 
F = (0 .3 • 88 + 0 . 7 . 132) = 108 
compared t o 9 4 b e f o r e t h e j u n i o r d e b t . The c o r r e s p o n d i n g e q u i t y 
v a l u e s a r e 1 20 - 108 = 1 2 ( w i t h new debt) and 26 ( b e f o r e new d e b t ) . 
The d e b t v a l u e g a i n e d 14 u n i t i e s , w h i l e the e q u i t y v a l u e l o s t t h e s e 
14 u n i t i e s . S i n c e t h e market v a l u e o f Bank C's c l a i m i s : 
F c = i l r 1 0 8 = 1 8 ' 
t h e f i r m d i d n o t g e t 14 b u t 18 u n i t i e s by r a i s i n g t h e a d d i t i o n a l 
l o a n . 
S i n c e the t r a n s a c t i o n changed the v a l u e s o f bank A 1 s and bank B's 
c l a i m s from 47 t o 45, the l o a n q u a n t i t y s h o u l d be d i v i d e d i n such a 
manner, t h a t the c a p i t a l owner would g e t 14 u n i t i e s and each o f the 
banks A and B would g e t 2 u n i t i e s . T h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n would keep 
t h e o l d market v a l u e r e l a t i o n o f the d e b t / e q u i t y c l a i m s . B u t d i s t r i -
b u t i n g the whole l o a n amount o f 18 t o the c a p i t a l owners, the s t o c k -
h o l d e r ' s w e a l t h i s i n c r e a s e d t o the d e t r i m e n t o f t h e o r i g i n a l c r e -
d i t o r s . 
A w e a l t h - s h i f t i n g on a c c o u n t o f the c r e d i t o r s c a u s e d by a c r e d i t 
f i n a n c e d d i v i d e n d payment can be l i m i t e d ( i n s p e c i a l c a s e s even 
e l i m i n a t e d ) i f t h e d e b t o f t h e i n i t i a l c r e d i t o r s i s s e c u r e d . 
L e t us c o n s i d e r t h e c a s e t h a t c r e d i t o r s A and B have p r o p e r t y 
r i g h t s ( c l a i m s ) o f the f i r m ' s a s s e t s , w h i c h a r e u n i t e d i n a s e -
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c u r i t y p o o l and c o n s i s t o f the l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s X and Y . 
Under t h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s the market v a l u e o f t h e t o t a l d e b t and t h e 
v a l u e o f the u n s e c u r e d d e b t a r e c o r r e s p o n d i n g as d e m o n s t r a t e d i n 
s e c t i o n 2.2, and F = 47 + 47 = 94 . 
I f the s e n i o r d e b t i s f u l l y s e c u r e d and the f i r m i s s u e s j u n i o r d e b t 
w i t h the p r i n c i p a l o f T c = 22 , i t s v a l u e w i l l be: 
I f t h e f i r m g e t s t h e d i s p o s a l o f t h i s l o a n q u a n t i t y and pays i t 
i n s t a n t l y t o the e q u i t y owners, t h e c l a i m s o f t h e c r e d i t o r s A and 
B a r e n o t d i l u t e d . S i n c e t h e i r d e b t i s s e c u r e d , t h e y a r e p r o t e c t e d 
a g a i n s t d i s t r i b u t i o n r i s k s c a used by c r e d i t f i n a n c e d d i v i d e n d pay-
ments t o t h e e q u i t y owners. 
As f a r as i t concerns d i v i d e n d payments by d e s i n v e s t m e n t ( b a l a n c e 
s h e e t c u t ) , t h e y too can be p r e v e n t e d by s e c u r i n g the d e b t . S e c u r e d 
d e b t g i v e s the c r e d i t o r the e x p l o i t a t i o n r i g h t on the s e c u r i t y such 
t h a t the management o f t h e f i r m c a n n o t a r b i t r a r i l y d i s p o s e of t h e 
a s s e t . T h e r e f o r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a d i v i d e n d payment, f i n a n c e d 
w i t h p r o c e e d s o f s o l d a s s e t s , i s r e d u c e d . 
However, a t o t a l p r e v e n t i o n of d e s i n v e s t m e n t f i n a n c e d payments i s 
r a t h e r i m p o s s i b l e . C r e d i t o r s would have t o use a l l t h e f i r m ' s a s s e t s 
as c o l l a t e r a l t o t r a n s f e r the r i g h t t o d i s p o s e o v e r t h e f i r m ' s 
e s t a t e t o t a l l y f r o m t h e management t o t h e l e n d e r s . S t i l l , by s e c u r -
i n g d e b t , one can i n s t a l l upper bounds f o r d i v i d e n d payments and 
p r o t e c t t h o s e a s s e t s w h i c h may n o t be s o l d i n o r d e r t o use the p r o -
ceeds f o r d i v i d e n d payments ( r e a l e s t a t e , n o t w o r k i n g a s s e t s ) . 
3.2.2 Changing the C r e d i t P o l i c y 
The l e v e r e d f i r m c a n r e p a y i t s d e b t t o some c r e d i t o r s p r e mature 
o r i t can s e c u r e some c r e d i t o r ' s d e b t . B o t h p o l i c i e s a r e d i s a d v a n -
tageous f o r the o t h e r c r e d i t o r s b ecause t h e i r c l a i m s ' v a l u e de-
c r e a s e s . I n t h e c a s e o f a pr e m a t u r e repayment a l l t h e r i s k i s t r a n s -
f e r r e d t o t h e r e s i d u a l d e b t , w h i l e i n t h e c a s e of s e c u r e d debt t h e 
amount o f s h i f t e d r i s k from s e c u r e d t o u n s e c u r e d d e b t depends on 
the q u a l i t y o f the c o l l a t e r a l . C r e d i t o r s w i t h c o n t r a c t s i n c l u d i n g 
c o l l a t e r a l c o v e n a n t s u s u a l l y do n o t have t o f e a r t h e s e forms o f 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n r i s k . 
148 
3.2.3 C h a n g i n g the I n v e s t m e n t P o l i c y 
F i n a l l y the f i r m has a t h i r d o p p o r t u n i t y t o t r a n s f e r r i s k i n v e s t i n g 
i n p r o j e c t s w i t h h i g h e r r i s k t h a n d e c l a r e d t o the c r e d i t o r s . Such an 
a l t e r e d i n v e s t m e n t p o l i c y can i n c r e a s e the v a l u e o f e q u i t y , because 
a l t h o u g h t h e d e f a u l t r i s k r i s e s , the f i r m r e a l i z e s h i g h e r y i e l d s f o r 
the b e n e f i t o f the s h a r e h o l d e r s i n d e f a u l t - f r e e s t a t e s (Swoboda 1982). 
L e t us assume a g a i n a f i r m w i t h two a s s e t s w i t h t h e l i q u i d a t i o n p r o -
ceeds X and Y and i n a d d i t i o n the o p p o r t u n i t y o f t h e f i r m t o keep 
two o t h e r a s s e t s w i t h t h e l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s Z and Y i n i t s 
e s t a t e w i t h o u t any t e c h n i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . T a b l e 2 d e s c r i b e s t h e 
y i e l d s o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e p l a n s x and z . 
Though the mean of the r e c e i p t s d i s t r i b u t i o n i s s i m i l a r f o r p l a n x 
and z c r e d i t o r s A and B w i t h r e c e i v a b l e s o f T^ = 55 and T ß = 55 
have e v e r y r e a s o n t o f e a r the r e a l i z a t i o n o f p l a n z i n s t e a d o f p l a n 
x . W h i l e t h e v a l u e o f d e b t i s F = 94 and t h e v a l u e o f e q u i t y i s 
E = 26 i f p l a n x i s c h osen, p l a n z w i l l p r o d u ce an e q u i t y v a l u e 
o f E** 42,4 and a d e b t v a l u e of o n l y F «77,6 . Thus the f i r m ' s 
management c a n cause an e s s e n t i a l i n c r e a s e o f the v a l u e o f e q u i t y by 
p r e f e r r i n g p r o j e c t s w i t h h i g h e r r i s k . 
C o l l a t e r a l c a n be seen as a t o o l t o p r e v e n t (or l i m i t ) d i s t r i b u t i o n 
r i s k , c aused by a change o f i n v e s t m e n t p o l i c y , b e cause the i n v e s t -
ment p o l i c y o f the f i r m would be d e t e r m i n e d i f bank A o r B 
p u t the s e c u r i t y w i t h t h e y i e l d X i n p l e d g e . 
To p r e v e n t an i n v e s t m e n t p o l i c y change, i t would even be s u f f i c i e n t 
i n t h i s c a s e , t h a t one o f the c r e d i t o r s p u t p l e d g e on a s s e t X . 
C o n d i t i o n a l o f the g i v e n c r e d i t r e l i a b i l i t y r i s k , s e c u r i n g one bank's 
d e b t w i l l a l s o improve the u n s e c u r e d c l a i m , because the r a i s e d de-
f a u l t r i s k , w h i c h the u n s e c u r e d c r e d i t o r has t o f a c e a f t e r the o t h e r 
c r e d i t o r s c l a i m , can be more t h a n compensated by t h e r e d u c t i o n o f 
the c r e d i t r e l i a b i l i t y r i s k . 
To p r o v e t h e s e market v a l u e r i s i n g e f f e c t s o f c o l l a t e r a l , we w i l l 
presume t h a t banks A and B e x p e c t w i t h an a p r i o r i p r o b a b i l i t y 
o f 5 0 % the r e a l i z a t i o n o f p l a n x o r z . I n t h i s c a s e the d e b t ' s 
v a l u e w i l l be 
F = 0 . 5 . 9 4 + 0 . 5 - 7 7 . 6 = 85 .8 
and the v a l u e s o f the c l a i m s A and B are 42.9 f o r each o f the c l a i m s . 
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state Si S2 s 3 mean 
^ - ^ ^ probability 0,3 0,4 0,3 
li q u i d a t i o n 
proceeds 
X 60 60 60 60 
plan x Y 28 105 72 72 
X + Y 88 165 132 132 
Z 0 105 60 60 
plan z Y 28 105 72 72 
Z + y 28 210 132 132 
table 2 
Now A g e t s t h e s e c u r i t y w i t h t h e l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s X as 
c o l l a t e r a l w i t h the r e s u l t of a r a i s e d v a l u e o f F =94 c a u s e d by 
t h e dropped c r e d i t r e l i a b i l i t y r i s k . The c o l l a t e r a l o f A p r o d u c e s 
a r i s k s h i f t i n g on a c c o u n t o f B and f a v o u r i n g A . 
The v a l u e o f the s e c u r e d c l a i m A i s 50 and the v a l u e o f t h e un-
s e c u r e d d e b t B i s o n l y 44, t h u s i n s p i t e o f t h e r i s k t r a n s f e r on 
a c c o u n t o f B the c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n i n c r e a s e s B's c l a i m f r o m 
42.9 t o 44 . 
4. A Scheme o f C r e d i t C o n t r a c t C ovenants 
4.1 C r e d i t C o n t r a c t Covenants 
The p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n s s h o u l d have made c l e a r t h a t c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n 
c a n cause a r i s k t r a n s f e r between t h e c r e d i t o r s , and c o l l a t e r a l i z a -
t i o n can i n f l u e n c e the b e h a v i o r o f t h e d e b t o r s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f 
c r e d i t . E s p e c i a l l y , c o l l a t e r a l c a n i n d u c e l e v e r a g e d f i r m s o r o t h e r 
economic s u b j e c t s t o r u n a d e c e n t d i v i d e n d , c r e d i t , and i n v e s t m e n t 
p o l i c y . 
One can a s c e r t a i n t h a t s e c u r i n g d e b t w i t h p l e d g e d a s s e t s i s a r a t h e r 
s t r o n g p o l i c y t o i n f l u e n c e the b e h a v i o r o f the e q u i t y owners. C r e d i t 
m a r k e t s have d e v e l o p e d a l s o o t h e r and weaker i n s t r u m e n t s t o l o w e r 
the r i s k - s h i f t i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n . These s t r a t e -
g i e s a r e documented i n t h e s e v e r a l t y p e s o f c r e d i t c o n t r a c t c o -
v e n a n t s i n f i g u r e 2. 
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C r e d i t c o n t r a c t c o v e n a n t s t o l ower c r e d i t r i s k 
r e f e r r i n g t o 
means o f payment 
G u a r a n t e e s S e c u r e d d e b t 
G e n e r a l l i e n on o b -
g u a r a n t e e s j e c t s and 
( p r i v a t e r i g h t s ( c r e -
p r o p e r t y d i t on s e -
o f u n - c u r i t i e s , 
l i m i t e d pawnbrok ing) 
p a r t n e r s , 
government 
g u a r a n t e e s ) 
r e g i s t e r e d 
mortgage and 
l a n d c h a r g e 
S p e c i a l 
g u a r a n t e e s 
( s u r e t y , 
c r e d i t -
i n s u r a n c e ) 
p a w n - l i k e 
r i g h t s 
( t r a n s f e r 
o f t i t l e s , 
c e s s i o n , 
l e a s i n g ) 
n o t d i r e c t l y r e f e r r i n g 
t o means o f payment 
S p e c i a l d u t i e s 
o f the d e b t o r 
i n f o r m a t i o n 
d u t i e s 
f i n a n c e - p o l i c y 
d e c l a r a t i o n s 
(obta inment o f 
b a l a n c e s h e e t 
r a t i o s , me 
f i r s t r u l e s ) 
r e a l - p o l i c y 
d e c l a r a t i o n s 
(maintenance 
o b l i g a t i o n s , 
i n s u r a n c e -
o b l i g a t i o n s ) 
S p e c i a l r i g h t s 
o f t h e c r e d i t o r 
i n f o r m a t i o n 
r i g h t s 
c a l l a b i l i t y -
r i g h t s 
( c r o s s - d e f a u l t -
c l a u s e ) 
l e g a l a c t i o n 
r i g h t s 
( b i l l o f 
e x c h a n g e , 
r e c e i v a b l e ) 
f i g u r e 2 
C r e d i t c o n t r a c t c o v e n a n t s a r e p r o v i s i o n s i n c l u d e d i n d e b t c o n t r a c t s 
which e i t h e r endow the c r e d i t o r s w i t h s p e c i a l r i g h t s o r b i n d t h e 
d e b t o r s t o s p e c i a l o b l i g a t i o n s . These c o v e n a n t s i n c o n t r a s t t o 
g u a r a n t e e - o r c o l l a t e r a l - a g r e e m e n t s , r e f e r o n l y i n d i r e c t l y t o means 
o f payment by i n f l u e n c i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s w h i c h d e t e r -
mine the amount o f repayment o f the d e b t o r . 
B e f o r e d i s c u s s i n g t h e c a s e s i n w h i c h the l e n d e r s s h o u l d use the 
s t r o n g e r o r the weaker p o l i c y t o c o n t r o l the d e b t o r ' s b e h a v i o r , we 
w i l l g i v e a s h o r t s u r v e y o f the d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f c o v e n a n t s . 
4.2 Covenants R e f e r r i n g I n d i r e c t l y t o Means o f Payment 
4.2.1 S p e c i a l O b l i g a t i o n s of the D e b t o r s 
S p e c i a l o b l i g a t i o n s a r e d u t i e s w h i c h a r e n o t g e n e r a l l y r e q u e s t e d by 
the codes o f c i v i l law. A f i r m , f o r example, can be o b l i g e d t o s u p p l y 
f i n a n c i a l and o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n f o r t h e c r e d i t p e r i o d . The i n f o r m a -
t i o n a b o u t t h e economic s t a t u s of t h e f i r m can be g e n e r a l ( b a l a n c e 
s h e e t s , f i n a n c i a l s t a t e m e n t s , r e p o r t s e t c . ) o r r e f e r t o s p e c i a l s i -
t u a t i o n s as changes i n mortgage r i g h t s o r i n management. A d d i t i o n a l -
l y / t h e b o r r o w e r can b i n d h i m s e l f t o o b t a i n c e r t a i n b a l a n c e s h e e t 
r e l a t i o n s , l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s o r c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e r e l a t i o n s as l o n g 
as t h e d e b t i s o u t s t a n d i n g . 
Of g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e a r e the so c a l l e d 'me f i r s t ' r u l e s . By i n c l u d i n g 
a me f i r s t r u l e i n h i s d e b t c o n t r a c t a c r e d i t o r wants t o p r o t e c t h i s 
p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t d i l u t i o n , w h i c h c a n be evoked i f the f i r m i s s u e s 
a d d i t i o n a l d e b t . We can d i f f e r between t h r e e t y p e s o f me f i r s t r u l e s 
• The d e b t o r can a s s u r e t h a t he w i l l n o t i s s u e d e b t w i t h a h i g h e r 
p r i o r i t y o r d o i n g so the e x i s t i n g d e b t w i l l be upgraded ( d e p t -
p r i o r i t y - e q u a l i t y ) . 
• S e c u r e d d e b t i s o f t e n endowed w i t h t h e o b l i g a t i o n of the d e b t o r 
t h a t the w i l l n o t s e l l , l e a s e o r pawn the s e c u r i t y , w i t h o t h e r 
words, t h e d e b t o r ' r e s e r v e s ' t h e p l e d g e d a s s e t t o t h e c r e d i t o r . 
• The most r e s t r i c t i v e t y p e o f me f i r s t r u l e s b i n d s the d e b t o r n o t 
t o s e l l , l e a s e o r pawn h i s a s s e t s , n o t t o s e c u r e any o t h e r d e b t , 
o r i n the extreme ca s e even n o t t o i s s u e any a d d i t i o n a l d e b t a t 
a l l . 
T h i s l a s t t y p e l e a d s us t o a group o f r e s t r i c t i o n s w h i c h b i n d s the 
d e b t o r t o a s p e c i f i c m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h i s a s s e t s . These o b l i g a t i o n s 
i n c l u d e f o r example the d u t y t o t r e a t r e a l e s t a t e , machines o r raw 
m a t e r i a l i n an o r d e r l y manner, o r t o i n s u r e t h e s e i t e m s . A l l t h e s e 
p r o v i s i o n s i n t e r f e r e w i t h the r e a l - s p h e r e o f t h e f i r m and u s u a l l y 
g e n e r a t e c o s t s . 
4.2.2 S p e c i a l R i g h t s o f the C r e d i t o r s 
A c c o r d i n g t o the s p e c i a l d u t i e s o f t h e d e b t o r s we w i l l f i r s t r e f e r 
t o t he i n f o r m a t i o n r i g h t s of t h e l e n d e r s w h i c h a r e n o t i n s t a l l e d i n 
c i v i l law. Banks o f t e n i n c l u d e i n t h e i r g e n e r a l c r e d i t r e q u i r e m e n t s 
t h e r i g h t o f an i n s i g h t i n the economic s i t u a t i o n of the b o r r o w e r 
a t any time wanted. A n o t h e r r i g h t o f t h e g e n e r a l r e q u i r e m e n t i s t h e 
c a l l a b i l i t y c l a u s e : the c r e d i t o r can r e q u e s t t h e immediate r e p a y -
ment o f the c r e d i t , i f the d e b t o r does n o t f u l f i l l h i s s p e c i a l ob-
l i g a t i o n s . 
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E u r o Bond c o n t r a c t s f o r example o f t e n i n c l u d e t h e so c a l l e d ' c r o s s 
d e f a u l t c l a u s e ' w h i c h g i v e s t h e c r e d i t o r t h e r i g h t t o c a l l t h e c r e -
d i t i f the d e b t o r f a i l s t o f u l f i l l h i s p a y m e n t - o b l i g a t i o n s punc-
t u a l l y t o any o t h e r c r e d i t o r . 
The c r e d i t o r s can a l s o be endowed w i t h s p e c i a l r i g h t s t o c a l l i n 
t h e i r due r e c e i v a b l e s . The c r e d i t o r , whose c l a i m i s b a s e d on a b i l l 
o f exchange does n o t need t o r e m i n d t h e d e b t o r and has t o t a k e no 
a c c o u n t o f any terms i f t h e d e b t o r does n o t r e p a y p u n c t u a l l y . The 
b i l l c r e d i t endows the c r e d i t o r w i t h t h e r i g h t o f t h e b i l l p r o t e s t : 
t h e c r e d i t o r g e t s a day o f c o u r t h e a r i n g a t an e a r l y d a t e and he 
g e t s i n t h e d e c l a r a t o r y s u i t an e n f o r c e a b l e t i t l e a g a i n s t t h e b i l l 
d e b t o r . Thus the b i l l o f exchange f a c i l i t a t e s t h e a c t i o n f o r payment, 
and t h e r e f o r e endows the b i l l c r e d i t o r w i t h e x t r a r i g h t s compared t o 
t h e u s u a l c i v i l law r e g u l a t i o n s o f c r e d i t c o n t r a c t s . 
4.3 C l a i m s o f C r e d i t o r s w h i c h R e f e r t o Means o f Payment 
W h i l e the j u s t d e s c r i b e d c o v e n a n t s r e f e r o n l y i n d i r e c t l y t o means 
o f payment by i n f l u e n c i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n , we now d i s -
c u s s the c l a i m o f c r e d i t o r s w h i c h do r e f e r t o means o f payment d i -
r e c t l y . T h i s t y p e o f c o v e n a n t s can be d i v i d e d i n c o l l a t e r a l - a g r e e -
ments ( s e c u r e d debt) and i n g u a r a n t e e - a g r e e m e n t s . 
S e c u r e d d e b t endows t h e l e n d e r w i t h t h e r i g h t t o s e i z e a p l e d g e d 
a s s e t o f t h e f i r m ' s e s t a t e i n c a s e o f d e f a u l t and t o s e l l i t . I f a 
bank f o r example s e c u r e s a c o r p o r a t i o n c r e d i t w i t h t h e s e i z e d depo-
s i t o f s e c u r i t i e s o f the f i r m and the c o r p o r a t i o n d e f a u l t s , t h e bank 
c a n s e l l the s e c u r i t i e s . S h o u l d the p r o c e e d s from the s a l e exceed 
t h e r e c e i v a b l e s o f the bank, the e x c e s s i s r e t u r n e d t o the d e b t o r 
o r h i s e s t a t e ; i f the p r o c e e d s a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t , t h e bank r e t a i n s 
a l l o f the p r o c e e d s and becomes an u n s e c u r e d c r e d i t o r f o r t h e r e -
m a inder due t o him. 
Depending on t h e l e g a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s e c u r e d d e b t one c a n 
d i s t i n g u i s h between l i e n on o b j e c t s and r i g h t s , r e g i s t e r e d mortgage 
and l a n d c h a r g e and p a w n - l i k e r i g h t s l i k e c e s s i o n and the t r a n s f e r 
o f t i t l e s f o r t h e purpose o f s e c u r i n g d e b t . 
G u a r a n t e e s a r e c l a i m s o f the l e n d e r s on means o f payment o f a t h i r d 
p a r t y . I f t h e o r i g i n a l b o r r o w e r c a n n o t r e p a y the c r e d i t , the g u a r a n -
t o r i s o b l i g e d t o f u l f i l l t he d e b t o r ' s l i a b i l i t i e s . 
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I f g u a r a n t e e s s e r v e t o improve the p o s i t i o n of a l l c r e d i t o r s , t h ey 
a r e s a i d t o be g e n e r a l g u a r a n t e e s . G e n e r a l g u a r a n t e e s i n c r e a s e the 
l i a b l e p r o p e r t y o f the company. Examples a r e government g u a r a n t e e s 
or t h e p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y o f u n l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s . I f g u a r a n t e e s r e f e r 
t o an i n d i v i d u a l d e b t c o n t r a c t (which i s t o a c e r t a i n c r e d i t o r o r 
a g r o u p o f c r e d i t o r s ) t h ey a r e s a i d t o be s p e c i a l g u a r a n t e e s . 
5. The E f f i c i e n c y o f S e c u r i n g Debt 
One c a n n o t answer g e n e r a l l y the q u e s t i o n i f c r e d i t o r s s h o u l d use a 
s t r o n g i n s t r u m e n t as c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n t o i n f l u e n c e the owner's 
p o l i c y , o r i f a weaker p o l i c y ( c o v e n a n t s ) i s s u f f i c i e n t , because i t 
depends on t h e s p e c i f i c c r e d i t s i t u a t i o n . The i n t e r b a n k market f o r 
example can do w i t h o u t c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n , because the m a r k e t p a r t i -
c i p a n t s know each o t h e r w e l l , and t h e market p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e i n 
s t e a d y c o m m e r c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e . I f a b o r r o w i n g bank u n d e r t o o k a 
b u s i n e s s p o l i c y on the c r e d i t o r ' s d e t r i m e n t , i t c o u l d v e r y e a s i l y 
l o s e i t s s t a n d i n g and c o u l d be e x c l u d e d from the market. T h e r e f o r e 
i t seems t o be d i s p e n s a b l e on such a m a r k e t t o i n f l u e n c e t h e deb-
t o r ' s p o l i c y e x p l i c i t l y . 
On t h e c o m m e r c i a l c r e d i t m arket, where longterm c r e d i t o r / d e b t o r r e -
l a t i o n s a r e a s c e r t a i n a b l e , one can o b s e r v e c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n and 
n o n p e c u n i a r y c o v e n a n t s t o r e g u l a t e t h e b e h a v i o r o f t h e d e b t o r . 
A c t u a l l y t h e s e n o n p e c u n i a r y c o v e n a n t s a r e e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t (as 
me f i r s t r u l e s ) . C o n c e r n i n g s m a l l e r f i r m s , c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n i s 
r e g u l a r , whereas the c r e d i t i n g banks r e q u e s t e s p e c i a l l y r e a l e s t a t e 
as s e c u r i t i e s . 
I f f i r m s i s s u e o n l y s m a l l l o a n q u a n t i t i e s and a r e r e l a t i v e l y unknown 
to t h e c r e d i t i n g bank (because the c r e d i t c o n t r a c t i s the s o l e r e -
l a t i o n between customer and bank) the bank w i l l s e c u r e i t s d e b t w i t h 
c o l l a t e r a l - a g r e e m e n t s t o i n f l u e n c e ( a l t h o u g h i n d i r e c t l y ) the f i r m ' s 
b u s i n e s s p o l i c y d u r i n g the p e r i o d o f c r e d i t . I n t h i s c a s e , c o l l a -
t e r a l i s an e f f i c i e n t and cheap i n s t r u m e n t o f d e b t o r ' s s e l f b i n d i n g , 
w h i c h c a n save the c r e d i t o r / d e b t o r r e l a t i o n c o s t l y p l a n n i n g - and 
m o n i t o r i n g c o s t s ( D r u k a r c z y k 1983, 1984). 
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6. Appendix: Secured Debt and Uncertainty 
6.1 The Firm's P o s i t i o n 
The f i n a n c i a l e f f e c t s of securing debt s h a l l be derived i n a s i n g l e 
period model of a stock company. The firm's estate contains two 
assets, each of which can be values independently of the other asset 
value. The market valued of the s e c u r i t i e s at the end of the period 
are given by X(s) >0 and Y(s) >0 , where s (s = 1 , 2, . . . , s) i s the 
occuring state i n t=1 . If q(s) i s the present value of a f i n a n -
c i a l claim which w i l l pay i t s owner one unity of money i f state s 
occurs, the market value V of the firm i n t = 0 i s given by: 
s 
V = I q(s) [X(s) + Y(s) ] . (1 ) 
s=l 
The firm has issued c r e d i t from bank A and B with the q u a n t i t i e s 
K A and K ß . The debt has to be repaid i n t = 1 i n the amount of 
T and T ß (the repayment includes the i n t e r e s t ) . 
Furtheron we assume that during the period l i a b i l i t i e s i n the amount 
of U w i l l evoke which are not priced on the c a p i t a l market, and 
which i n case of d e f a u l t outrank the receivables T^ and T ß . To 
keep the anal y s i s simple, l e t us assume U<X(s) +Y(s) holds for 
a l l s such that the market value of the firm's s e c u r i t i e s i n t = 1 
i s i n no case lower than the amount of the l i a b i l i t y U . Given the 
t o t a l claim of the c r e d i t o r s on the firm i s T = T A + T ß i n t = 1 , 
debt's value i n t = 0 w i l l be: 
s 
F= I q(s) min[T,X(s) + Y(s) - u] , (2) 
s = l 
because the banks w i l l get t h e i r receivable T or i n case of defaul 
the r e s i d u a l of the firm's value minus the amount of U , since U 
has the higher p r i o r i t y . This r e s i d u a l amount w i l l be smaller than 
the value of T , but since we assumed U<X(s) +Y(s) , the repay-
ment to the banks cannot be negative. 
Given X + Y >U + T holds for each state s , where s = 1 , 2 , . . . , k-1 
and X + Y<U + T holds for each state s , where s = k,k+1,...,s , 
we d e l i v e r a rule of d i s t r i b u t i o n of the firm's estate to the c r e d i -
tors which corresponds to the Act of Bankruptcy. If the states of 
the world are divided i n the described way, the value of the debt 
w i l l be: 
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k-1 s 
F = T I q(s) + I q(s) [X(s) +Y(s) -U] . (3) 
s=l s=k 
I n t h e case o f d e f a u l t t h e r e s i d u a l amount o f t h e f i r m ' s e s t a t e minus 
U w i l l be s h a r e d between c r e d i t o r s p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e i r o r i g i n a l 
r e c e i v a b l e s T A and T ß . Thus t h e m a r k e t v a l u e o f bank A's p a r t 
o f t he debt w i l l be (on a c c o u n t o f a c l e a r e r p r e s e n t a t i o n we w i l l 
s t o p i n d i c a t i n g X and Y f u r t h e r o n ) : 
s r T A 




I q(s) min[T,X + Y - U] 
T s=l 
T ' 
and t he market v a l u e o f bank B's r e c e i v a b l e i s : 
(5) 
s r tB 
F = X q(s) minj T , — (X + Y - U) 
B 8=1 L B T 
ip S 
= -2- I q(s) min[T,X+Y-U] 
s=l 
- F . 
T 
S i n c e the s h a r e h o l d e r s have c l a i m on t h e f i r m ' s a s s e t s minus t h e sum 
of l i a b i l i t i e s i n t = 1 , and be c a u s e of t h e l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y o f 
common s t o c k , t h e v a l u e o f t h e e q u i t y w i l l be: 
s 
E= I q(s) max[X+Y-U-T , 0 ] (6) 
s=l 
k-1 
= I q(s) [X+Y-U-T] 
s=l 
S i n c e the market v a l u e o f the f i r m i s t h e sum o f the v a l u e s o f e q u i t y 
and debt and a t t h e same ti m e t h e m a r k e t v a l u e V o f t h e a s s e t minus 
t h e p r e s e n t v a l u e s o f t h e non mar k e t v a l u e d l i a b i l i t i e s , one can 
w r i t e : 
W = E + F 
s 
= I q(s) [X+Y-U] 
s=l 
s 




6.2 D e r i v a t i o n o f the V a l u e o f S e c u r e d Debt 
L e t us assume now t h a t bank A g e t s t h e a s s e t w i t h t h e mar k e t v a l u e 
X as a c o l l a t e r a l f o r i t s c r e d i t . I n t h e c a s e o f d e f a u l t A has a 
c l a i m on t h e a s s e t w i t h v a l u e X ; t h u s t h e mar k e t v a l u e o f bank A's 
r e c e i v a b l e i s : 
The f i r s t sum o f (8) c o n s i d e r s t h a t i f t h e f i r m does n o t d e f a u l t A 
w i l l g e t t h e e n t i r e amount o f i t s r e c e i v a b l e T^ , w h i l e t h e second 
sum o f (8) d e s c r i b e s t h e p a y o f f t o A i n c a s e o f d e f a u l t ( a l l s t a t e s 
where U +T > X + Y h o l d s ) , where A makes use o f t h e c o l l a t e r a l and 
r e c e i v e s i t s market v a l u e X ( s ) . I f t h e p r o c e e d s X ( s ) exceed T A , 
t h e s u r p l u s i s g i v e n back t o t h e b a n k r u p t ' s e s t a t e , b e c a u s e t h e r e -
payment t o A may n o t e x c e s s i t s r e c e i v a b l e T A . B u t i f t h e r e -
c e i v a b l e T A exceeds t h e p r o c e e d s o f X (T^ > X) , bank A has a 
r e s i d u a l c l a i m on t h e b a n k r u p t ' s e s t a t e i n t h e amount o f t h e e x c e s s 
T A - X , w h i c h i s o u t r a n k e d by the t a x c o s t s U , b u t i s on e q u a l 
p r i o r i t y w i t h t h e r e c e i v a b l e s o f bank B . I n t h e c a s e o f Y > U , 
t h e r e s i d u a l c l a i m o f bank A w i l l y i e l d t h e p o s i t i v e r a t i o 
( T A - X) / (T - X) , whereas o t h e r w i s e t h e r a t i o w i l l be z e r o , b e c a u s e 
t h e r e s i d u a l a s s e t s a r e used t o pay t h e l i a b i l i t y U . 
L e t us a d d i t i o n a l l y d i v i d e t h e s t a t e s o f t h e w o r l d (k,k+1 , . . . , s) 
i n t h e s t a t e s (k,k+1,...,1-1) , where x - T A h o l d s , and i n t h e 
s t a t e s (1,1+1,...,s) , where X < T A h o l d s , and we can change (8) 
t o : 
1-1 
'x + max^—-(Y-U),o|» . (9) F = T I q(s) + I q (s) 
A A S=l S=l 
{ ^ < Y - U > , o }
The f i r s t sum of e q u a t i o n (9) shows t h a t A w i l l g e t t h e whole 
amount o f i t s r e c e i v a b l e i f t h e f i r m does n o t d e f a u l t ( s = 1 , 2 , . . . , 
k-1) , o r i f d e f a u l t does o c c u r , t h e l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s o f t h e 
c o l l a t e r a l a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o pay T A c o m p l e t e l y (s=k,k+1,...,1-1) . 
The second sum i n c l u d e s t h e p r e s e n t v a l u e o f b a n k r u p t ' s e s t a t e i f 
t h e r e c e i v a b l e T A exceeds t h e y i e l d s o f t h e c o l l a t e r a l . I n t h i s 
c a s e t h e bank w i l l g e t t h e v a l u e X o f the c o l l a t e r a l and i t s p a r t 
o f t h e redundancy Y - U , i f t h i s m a r g i n i s p o s i t i v e . 
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Comparing e q u a t i o n (9) t o ( 4 ) , whereas e q u a t i o n (4) v a l u e s t h e un-
s e c u r e d c r e d i t o f A , and (9) t h e s e c u r e d c l a i m , one can see t h a t 
c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n 
• has r a i s e d t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a t o t a l repayment t o bank A , un-
l e s s none o f t h e s t a t e s s = (k,k+1 , . . . , 1-1 ) o c c u r s . 
• has d i m i n i s h e d t h e amount o f an e v e n t u a l l a c k o f payment t o bank 
A , u n l e s s X = 0 h o l d s f o r s = ( 1,1+1 , . . . , s) . 
I f one e x c l u d e s t h e extreme c a s e where X = 0 h o l d s f o r s = (k,k+1, 
....,s) , t h e m a rket v a l u e o f t h e s e c u r e d d e b t q u a n t i f i e d by (9) i s 
h i g h e r t h a n t h e one o f t h e u n s e c u r e d d e b t i n e q u a t i o n ( 4 ) . And 
f i n a l l y i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t , a l t h o u g h a p o s i t i v e d e f a u l t r i s k 
o c c u r s , bank A can c o n s t r u c t a r i s k l e s s c r e d i t p o s i t i o n by c o l l a -
t e r a l i z a t i o n . I f X > T A h o l d s f o r a l l s t a t e s s = (k,k+1,...,s) 
bank A's c l a i m i s f r e e o f any c r e d i t r i s k and i t s v a l u e i s : 
F =T ! q(s) 
s=l 
6.3 M a r k e t V a l u e o f t h e Debt i n Dependence o f i t s C o l l a t e r a l P o l i c y 
Now we have t o examine t h e i n f l u e n c e o f c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n on t h e 
v a l u e o f t h e d e b t and o f t h e f i r m . I f s e c u r i n g bank A's d e b t r a i s e s 
n o t o n l y t h e v a l u e of i t s r e c e i v a b l e b u t a l s o t h e market v a l u e o f t h e 
d e b t , t h e m a rket v a l u e o f t h e f i r m c an a l s o be i n c r e a s e d . To p r o v e 
t h e s e r e l a t i o n s , we w i l l f i r s t i n s p e c t t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c y o f t h e 
v a l u e o f bank A's r e c e i v a b l e w i t h t h e c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n o f i t s 
d e b t . 
We can e x p r e s s the v a l u e o f t h e u n s e c u r e d d e b t by: 
k - l 1-1 
F =T I q(s) + I q (s) max {(X - T ) + (Y - U) ,0} (10) B B „ , " s=l s=k 
+ X q(s) m a x | ^ (Y-U) ,oj 
The f i r s t sum s t a n d s f o r the m a rket v a l u e o f t h e r e c e i v a b l e i n t h o s e 
s t a t e s where d e f a u l t does n o t o c c u r . The second sum i n d i c a t e s t h e 
market v a l u e i n t h e c a s e t h a t t h e p r o c e e d s o f s e c u r i t y X i n e x c e s s 
of the r e c e i v a b l e T^ o f bank A a l o n g w i t h t h e p r o c e e d s o f s e -
c u r i t y Y s e r v e t o pay t h e l i a b i l i t y U . A f t e r t h i s l i a b i l i t y i s 
p a i d t o o , bank B can d i s p o s e o v e r t h e r e s i d u a l b a n k r u p t ' s e s t a t e . 
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The t h i r d sum r e f e r s t o the s i t u a t i o n , where t he c o l l a t e r a l - p r o c e e d s 
c a n n o t s a t i s f y bank A's r e c e i v a b l e e n t i r e l y , such t h a t A and B 
have t o s h a r e o u t Y - U p r o p o r t i o n a l t o the q u a n t i t y o f t h e i r 
c l a i m a f t e r the l i a b i l i t y U i s p a i d . 
I f you add the market v a l u e s of (9) and (10) you w i l l g e t t h e market 
v a l u e F 0 o f the d e b t under t h e as s u m p t i o n t h a t c r e d i t o r A g e t s 
t h e a s s e t w i t h t h e v a l u e X as a c o l l a t e r a l f o r i t s c r e d i t . 
k-1 1-1 
F 0 = T I q(s) + X q(s) max{X + Y-U,T} (11) 
s=l s=k 
s 
+ X q(s) max {X + Y - U , X } . 
s=l 
We w i l l now compare t h i s market v a l u e F 0 w i t h t h e market v a l u e 
g i v e n i n (3) which i n d i c a t e s the v a l u e of the u n s e c u r e d d e b t . F o r 
an e a s i e r d e m o n s t r a t i o n e q u a t i o n (3) i s r e w r i t t e n a s : 
k-l 1-1 s 
F = T X q(s) + X q(s ) [ X + Y - u ] + X q(s ) [ x + Y - u ] . (31) 
s=l s=k s=l 
Formulas (3') and (11) y i e l d 
1-1 s 
F 0 = F+ X q(s) max {0, (TA-X) + (U-Y)} + X q (s ) max {0, (U-Y)} > F (12) 
s=k s=l 
whereby the i n e q u a l i t y F 0 >F can be s t r i c t s i n c e some s t a t e s c o u l d 
o c c u r where c r e d i t o r s w i l l r e c e i v e l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s on a c c o u n t 
o f t h e r e c e i v a b l e s U . From (12) we see t h a t t h i s i s t h e c a s e i f 
T >X+Y-U holds for at least one of the states s = k , . . . , l - l or i f Y<U A 
holds for at least one of the states s = 1,.. . ,s . 
The s i z e o f the i n c r e a s e o f F 0 depends on the amount o f the de-
f a u l t r i s k which i s t r a n s f e r r e d to the c r e d i t o r w i t h r e c e i v a b l e U , 
caus e d by s e c u r i n g the de b t o f A . 
6.4 The M a x i m i z a t i o n o f the Market V a l u e w i t h T o t a l C o l l a t e r a l 
P o l i c y 
I f bank A would not g e t o n l y p r o c e e d s X , b u t a l s o Y as a 
c o l l a t e r a l , the market v a l u e o f i t s c l a i m would be: 
m-1 s 
F = T X q(s)+ Z q ( s ) [ X + Y] , (13) 
A A s=l m 
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i f s t a t e s ( 1,1+1 , . . . , s) a r e d i v i d e d i n (1,1+1,...,m-1) , where 
X +Y > T A h o l d s , and i n (m,m+1,...,s) , where X + Y < T A h o l d s . 
The market v a l u e of bank B's c l a i m w o u l d t h e n be: 
k -1 m-1 
F =T Z q(s) + Z q(s) max (X + Y -T - U , 0} . (14) 
D D A s=l s=k 
Ad d i n g t h e market v a l u e s o f (13) und (14) t o t h e market v a l u e F o o 
o f t h e d e b t , i f A i s t o t a l l y s e c u r e d , one r e c e i v e s : 
k-1 m-1 s 
Foo=T Z q(s) + Z q(s) max {X + Y - U,TA) + Z q(s)[x + Y] . (15) 
s=l s=k s=m 
Comparing (15) w i t h t h e market v a l u e F o f t h e d e b t g i v e n i n ( 3 ) , 
whic h r e f e r s t o t h e u n s e c u r e d d e b t , one c a n see t h a t t h e market 
v a l u e o f t h e d e b t i s : 
m-1 s 
Foo=F+ Z q(s) max (0,T A+U - (X+Y)} + U Z q ( s ) > F 0 > F , (16) 
s=k s=m 
i f the c l a i m o f bank A i s t o t a l l y s e c u r e d . C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h i s 
d e r i v a t i o n i t c o u l d be e a s i l y c o n f i r m e d t h a t t h e market v a l u e o f t h e 
de b t c o u l d be r a i s e d , i f bank B's d e b t would be a l s o s e c u r e d . The 
r i s k t r a n s f e r t o U i s o b t a i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e chosen form of 
c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n . Whether the s e c u r i t i e s w h i c h s e r v e as c o l l a t e r a l 
a r e o r d e r e d i n a r a n k i n g ( f i r s t and second mortgage e.g.) o r a s e -
c u r i t i e s p o o l i s o f no i m p o r t a n c e . 
I f no r e c e i v a b l e s U have t o be c o n s i d e r e d , (16) shows t h a t s i n c e 
U = 0 and X > T A h o l d s f o r s = k, k+1 , . . , 1-1 , r e s p . X + Y > T A h o l d s 
f o r s=1,1+1,...,m-1 , t h e market v a l u e o f t h e d e b t , i f d e b t A i s 
t o t a l l y s e c u r e d , e q u a l s t h e v a l u e o f t h e d e b t w i t h o u t c o l l a t e r a l i z a -
t i o n . Thus, i f t h e chosen c o l l a t e r a l i s o n l y t h e l i q u i d a t i o n p r o c e e d s 
X , as d e s c r i b e d i n s e c t i o n 2.2, a market v a l u e r i s e can n e i t h e r be 
a c h i e v e d , s i n c e i f U = 0 i n ( 1 1 ) , one g e t s : 
max{x+Y,T} = (X + Y) i n s = k , . . . , l - l and A 
max{x + Y, x] = (X + Y) i n s = l , . . . , s 
and t h u s 
k-1 s 
F 0 = T Z q(s)+ Z q(s)(X + Y) , ( 1 7 ) 
s=l s=k 
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and t h e r e f o r e 
Fo = F . (18) 
W i t h F from (3') and U = 0 one g e t s t h e r e s u l t t h a t a l t h o u g h the 
c o l l a t e r a l c a u s e s a c r e d i t o r ' s r i s k t r a n s f e r from bank A t o bank B , 
th e d e b t p o l i c y i s i r r e l e v a n t f o r t h e amount o f t h e ma r k e t v a l u e o f 
t h e t o t a l d e b t and t h e r e f o r e a l s o i r r e l e v a n t f o r the ma r k e t v a l u e of 
t h e f i r m , i f a l l c l a i m s on t h e f i r m a r e v a l u e d on t h e market. 
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